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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TEACHING THE FORGOTTEN FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND
THE CONSTITUTION OF MEMORY

MARK A. GRABER*
Most constitutional law professors teach a highly edited version of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 1 The pedagogical version of the received text in most
classes consists of the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the
Enforcement Clause so that the taught Fourteenth Amendment for all practical
purposes reads:
No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
....
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, [the
Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause].

Occasionally, the taught Fourteenth Amendment is slightly more expansive.
While, students who read the Slaughter-House Cases 2 learn that the Privileges
and Immunities Clause 3 has been largely moribund for almost a century and a
half, those who read Justice Clarence Thomas’s concurrence in McDonald v.
City of Chicago realize that resurrection is possible. 4 Some constitutional law
professors note that the Citizenship Clause 5 overturns the holding of Dred Scott
v. Sandford 6 and has implications for birthright citizenship. 7 But no one teaches

* Regents Professor, University of Maryland Carey School of Law.
1. The evidence for this paragraph is highly anecdotal. Skeptics should consult the other
essays in this issue and all the constitutional law textbooks on their bookshelves.
2. 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.”)
4. 561 U.S. 742, 806, 813–50 (2010).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside.”)
6. 60 U.S. 393, 454 (1857).
7. See Benjamin Wallace Mendelson, Note, Courts Have Gone off the Map: The Geographic
Scope of the Citizenship Clause, 95 TEX. L. REV. 873, 873 (2017).
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anything about Sections 2, 8 3, 9 and 4 10 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Students
who do not at some point read the entire Constitution in the appendix of their
text are unlikely to know those provisions exist. Whether most constitutional
law professors know their contents is doubtful.
The taught Fourteenth Amendment inverts the original Fourteenth
Amendment. 11 The first draft of the Fourteenth Amendment was a standalone
version of what eventually became Section 2 of the final text. 12 The
Reconstruction Congress debated that text for a month before that provision
went down to defeat in the Senate. 13 After the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction came back with what became the five-section text, members of
Congress spent most of their energy debating Sections 2 and 3, some energy
discussing Section 4, and hardly any energy considering Section 1 or 5. 14 John
Bingham, the only member of Congress who displayed serious interest in
Section 1, devoted his attention almost entirely to the Privileges and Immunities
Clause. 15

8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (“Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State,
excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for
President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and
Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male
inhabitants of such a State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in
any way abridged, exception for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of
representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens
shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.”)
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3 (“No person shall be a Senator or Representative in
Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress,
or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or
judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or give aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.”)
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4 (“The validity of the public debt of the United States,
authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States, nor
any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion
against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts,
obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.”)
11. The arguments in this paragraph will be elaborated in MARK A. GRABER, CONSTRUCTING
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS: THADDEUS STEVENS, JOHN BINGHAM, AND THE FORGOTTEN
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2483355 [https://perma.cc/5ZWQ-PGWW].
12. Id. (manuscript at 33).
13. Id. (manuscript at 42).
14. Id. & n.123.
15. See id. (manuscript at 46, 53 n.170).
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This brief Essay explores why professors might teach the forgotten
Fourteenth Amendment. Some reasons are obvious. Professors who take a
historical approach to constitutional pedagogy should teach the correct history
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Some reasons are rooted in traditional legal
pedagogy. Several scholars provide good reasons why the forgotten Fourteenth
Amendment should again become part of the litigated constitution, the subject
of most constitutional law classes. The forgotten Fourteenth Amendment is an
excellent vehicle for teaching students the difference between originalism as
practiced by historians and originalism as practiced by advocates. Still other
reasons focus on questions of constitutional authority. By teaching the
Constitution of Memory, professors may contrast the twentieth-century
commitment to judicial supremacy with the nineteenth-century commitment to
partisan supremacy. Students who understand that how the Constitution works
today is not how the Constitution worked in the past are prepared to explore how
contemporary constitutional politics may resurrect older approaches to
constitutional authority or generate new means for settling constitutional
controversies. 16
I. LET’S TEACH HISTORY (OR CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT)
Many constitutional law classes take historical perspectives or the political
science perspectives associated with the study of American political and
constitutional development. Undergraduate programs and many graduate
programs in history and political science routinely offer classes in constitutional
law. Some classes focus on legal doctrine. Others, recognizing that PhD faculty
are far better able to teach distinctive disciplinary concerns than legal doctrine
and that students who go to law school will get all the doctrine they need, treat
constitutional law as an opportunity to explore the American constitutional
regime more generally. 17 Many law professors, in part because of taste and in
part out of recognition that their students are unlikely to practice constitutional
law, similarly emphasize facets of American constitutionalism other than
constitutional litigation. Their constitutional law classes provide vital civic
education for lawyers who are likely to play important roles in American civil
society, even if they never litigate a Fourteenth Amendment claim. 18
16. One should not underestimate the contribution the forgotten Fourteenth Amendment
makes to professorial showing off. Professors who wish to demonstrate that they have mastered the
most obscure constitutional provisions can impress students by expounding at great length on
Sections 2, 3, and 4.
17. See Mark A. Graber, Constitutionalism and Political Science: Imaginative Scholarship,
Unimaginative Teaching, 3 PERSP. ON POL. 135, 141 (2005), http://digitalcommons.law.umary
land.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1312&context=fac_pubs.
18. See Sanford Levinson, Reconsidering the Syllabus in “Constitutional Law,” 117 YALE
L.J. F., http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/reconsidering-the-syllabus-in-constitutional-law
[https://perma.cc/22BF-VSU3].
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The forgotten Fourteenth Amendment belongs in the teaching canon for
American constitutionalism taught as history. Historians emphasize the
“strangeness” of past practice. 19 By teaching students the concerns that
motivated the persons responsible for the Fourteenth Amendment, professors
highlight the gap between mid-nineteenth-century constitutionalism and
contemporary constitutional practice. Contemporary Americans regard John
Bingham as the “founding son” of the Fourteenth Amendment and put Section
1 at the heart of that text. 20 Republicans in 1866 followed Thaddeus Stevens
and regarded Sections 2 and 3 as the core of that text. Stevens gave the most
important speech for understanding the Fourteenth Amendment when he
declared that a constitutional amendment was needed “to secure perpetual
ascendancy to the party of the Union; and so as to render our republican
Government firm and stable forever.” 21 This assertion explains the importance
of Section 2, 3, and 4 to Republicans during Reconstruction. These provisions,
prominent Republicans repeatedly claimed, simultaneously made the United
States more democratic and prevented rule by a revived Democratic/Slave
Power alliance. Republicans other than John Bingham paid little attention to
Section 1 because they believed constitutional protections for persons of color
were parchment barriers in the absence of a dominant party committed to
implementing those constitutional protections. 22
The historical perspective on the forgotten Fourteenth Amendment slides
easily into the political science perspective, or at least the perspective of those
political scientists interested in American political and constitutional
development. Political scientists who study American political and
constitutional development document and explain continuity and change in
American politics over time. 23 From this political science perspective, Stevens
was articulating a core element of Jacksonian democracy. Parties during the midnineteenth century were the primary agents of constitutional meaning, not
courts. 24 This understanding of constitutional authority helps students
understand why, in the entire congressional debate over drafting the Fourteenth
Amendment, only a few minor participants suggested that courts might
independently implement Section 1. 25 Classroom conversation may then turn to
the breakdown of the movement parties underlying the partisan constitution of

19. See Linda K. Kerber, Making Republicanism Useful, 97 YALE L.J. 1663, 1664–65 (1988).
20. GERALD N. MAGLIOCCA, AMERICAN FOUNDING SON: JOHN BINGHAM AND THE
INVENTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2013).
21. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1865).
22. GRABER, supra note 11 (manuscript at 35–49).
23. See KAREN ORREN & STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE SEARCH FOR AMERICAN POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT (2004).
24. Mark A. Graber, Separation of Powers, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION (Karen Orren & John Compton eds., 2018).
25. GRABER, supra note 11 (manuscript at 50, 54).
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the nineteenth century, the replacement of movement parties by non-ideological
parties, and how non-ideological parties fueled the rise of litigation and courts
as the central means for constitutional development. 26
II. THE FORGOTTEN FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE LITIGATED
CONSTITUTION
The forgotten Fourteenth Amendment plays two important roles in the
litigated constitution. Professors may use Sections 2, 3, and 4 when
demonstrating how successful litigators avoid constitutional barriers by shifting
the terrain of constitutional conversation. Courts reluctant to overrule
precedents decided under one constitutional clause may become more receptive
when the same result is based on a different constitutional provision. The
forgotten Fourteenth Amendment is an excellent vehicle for thinking about
originalism. The near exclusive framing concern with Sections 2, 3, and 4
suggests the probability that no original understanding of Section 1 existed, at
least from an historical perspective. This insight might highlight problems with
originalism or merely how historians seek original understanding differs from
how constitutional lawyers seek original understandings.
A.

Litigating the Forgotten Fourteenth Amendment

Successful constitutional litigators know how to “jump[] tracks.” 27
Professor Gordon Silverstein, who introduced the metaphor with respect to
constitutional practice, points out how courts are often receptive to arguments
changing the course of constitutional law that substitute new constitutional
foundations for claims previously rejected on other constitutional foundations.
He notes how the Supreme Court in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States 28
and Congress when passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964 successfully reversed
the result in the Civil Rights Cases 29 by deriving the power to ban racial
discrimination in places of public accommodation from the Commerce Clause
rather than from Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 30 Baker v. Carr is
another well-known instance of track jumping. 31 The Justices in that case ruled
that constitutional attacks on malapportionment that the Court had previously
ruled non-justiciable under the Guarantee Clause of Article IV 32 were justiciable

26. Mark A. Graber, Judicial Supremacy and the Structure of Partisan Conflict, 50 IND. L.
REV. 141, 160–61, 166 (2016).
27. GORDON SILVERSTEIN, LAW’S ALLURE: HOW LAW SHAPES, CONSTRAINS, SAVES, AND
KILLS POLITICS 73 (2009).
28. 379 U.S. 241, 261–62 (1964).
29. 109 U.S. 3, 25–26 (1883).
30. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 27, at 77, 80.
31. 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962).
32. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
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when made under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 33
The Court in both cases might have reached the same conclusion if absolutely
forced to reconsider the grounds of the earlier decision. Given the general
receptivity of the Warren Court to civil rights claims, the Justices in Heart of
Atlanta Motel probably would have overruled the Civil Rights Cases had no
constitutional alternative existed. 34 Nevertheless, constitutional litigators
generally attempt to make as easy as possible a judicial decision in favor of their
client or cause. Given that jumping the track is a standard way for overcoming
judicial reluctance to overrule precedents, constitutional law classes focused on
constitutional litigation should teach students how to employ that jurisprudential
technique.
Professor Franita Tolson is presently completing an important work
demonstrating how legal advocates may use the forgotten Fourteenth
Amendment to jump the track in voting rights cases. 35 Her concern is
congressional power to abrogate state sovereignty when enforcing the right to
vote. The majority opinion, concurrence, and dissent in Shelby County v. Holder
limit their discussions to whether Congress under Section 1 of the remembered
Fifteenth Amendment could impinge on state sovereignty when retaining the
preclearance formula used in previous voting rights acts. 36 Tolson begins her
discussion by noting that Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes
Congress to deprive a state of representation whenever the national legislature
finds that the state in question has withheld the ballot from persons of color. 37
This is a severe impingement on state sovereignty. Therefore, Tolson concludes,
interpreted in light of Section 2, Section 5 permits Congress to impose lesser
penalties than a reduction of representation after Congress concludes that a
state’s voting laws and practices unconstitutionally discriminate against persons
of color. 38
Inspired by Professor Tolson’s example, constitutional law classes might
explore other uses of the forgotten Fourteenth Amendment to achieve
constitutional goals by jumping the track. Akhil Amar’s claim that Section 2
protects the right to vote is one example, 39 as is Jack Balkin’s claim that Section

33. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 27, at 85.
34. RICHARD C. CORTNER, CIVIL RIGHTS AND PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS: THE HEART OF
ATLANTA MOTEL AND MCCLUNG CASES 145 (2001).
35. FRANITA TOLSON, A PROMISE UNFULFILLED: SECTION 2 OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE (forthcoming 2018).
36. 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2618–2631 (2013); Id. at 2631–32 (Thomas, J., concurring); Id. at 2632–
52 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
37. Franita Tolson, What is Abridgment: A Critique of Two Section Twos, 67 ALA. L. REV.
433, 438 (2015).
38. Id. at 457.
39. Akhil Reed Amar, The Lawfulness of Section 5—and Thus of Section 5, 126 HARV. L.
REV. F. 109, 117 (2013).
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4, by forbidding the United States to default on the federal debt, permits the
President to raise the debt ceiling unilaterally. 40 Students might put Section 3 to
creative use in debates over whether to maintain monuments to Confederate
notables. Prominent Confederates, that text suggests, were traitors in need of
pardons, not heroes who merited statutes. Other claims are obviously possible.
The important point is that the jumping the tracks exercise highlights that
effective constitutional litigators are creative. They do not simply parrot the
standardized answers that professors expect on constitutional law finals. Rather,
they refashion constitutional material, often forgotten constitutional material, in
ways that make their constitutional claims and principles appear to make the
Constitution “the best it can be.” 41
III. THE FORGOTTEN FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
The forgotten Fourteenth Amendment is an excellent vehicle for teaching
students the differences between historical and legal originalism. The emphasis
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers on Sections 2, 3, and 4 requires
contemporary originalists to ask questions that the framers neither asked nor
answered. John Bingham aside, no Republican in 1866 expounded at length and
repeatedly on the meaning of Section 1. Bingham, in his more frequent speeches,
said almost nothing about the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process
Clause. 42 Republicans were unconcerned with the substantial meaning of
Section 1 because they were seeking to ensure their coalition would retain the
power necessary to implement the Thirteenth Amendment. They did not think
of themselves as establishing fixed legal rules restricting state power. To
complicate matters further, Republican understandings of the post-Civil War
Amendments changed in response to changing circumstances, making
constitutionally arbitrary any effort to privilege the dominant understanding at
any particular time or in any particular place. The changing emphases and
politics underlying the forgotten Fourteenth Amendment belie Section 1
originalism as history, but do not undermine the more fundamental project of
originalism, which is to reconstruct American history in ways that privilege
contemporary projects. 43 The forgotten Fourteenth Amendment reminds law
students that advocates interpret history as lawyers, not as historians.

40. Jack M. Balkin, The Not-So-Happy Anniversary of the Debt-Ceiling Crisis, THE
ATLANTIC (July 31, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/07/the-not-so-happy
-anniversary-of-the-debt-ceiling-crisis/260458/ [https://perma.cc/LR74-SEHK].
41. Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Ambitions for Itself, 71 VA. L. REV. 173, 177 (1985).
42. GRABER, supra note 11 (manuscript at 45, 51, 54).
43. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011); Eric J. Segall, Commentary, The
Constitution According to Justices Scalia and Thomas: Alive and Kickin’, 91 WASH. U. L. REV.
1663, 1666–67 (2014).
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Republicans in 1866 did not answer the questions contemporary originalists
ask about the meaning of Section 1. When questions arose about the meaning of
Section 2 and 3, the Joint Committee on Reconstruction produced a new draft
that clarified any ambiguity. 44 The Joint Committee ignored Democrats who
claimed Section 1 was hopelessly ambiguous. 45 The few Republicans who
attempted to interpret Section 1 offered inconsistent comments. 46 Most
Republicans simply stated that Section 1 was a nice statement of broad principles
already inherent in the Constitution. 47 No historian looking at the debates in
Congress over the Fourteenth Amendment could conclude with good conscience
that the framers of the Section 1 had anything clear to say about any
contemporary Fourteenth Amendment issue.
Contemporary originalists seek answers to the questions that Republicans
did not ask. The important provisions of Sections 2 and 3 of the Fourteenth
Amendment were designed to secure the Republican Party as the main vehicle
for implementing the Thirteenth Amendment. 48 Republicans did not intend the
Fourteenth Amendment to resolve disputes among themselves, such as whether
the Constitution, before or after 1865, guaranteed persons of color the right to
vote or whether segregation was consistent with equality. Those matters were
for Republicans to determine in the future.49 They were constructing
constitutional politics, not making constitutional law. They were asking
nineteenth-century questions such as “what democratic rules will best secure a
Republican majority for the foreseeable future,” rather than twenty-first century
questions such as “does racial bias render capital punishment unconstitutional,”
or “is partisan gerrymandering unconstitutional?”
The forgotten Fourteenth Amendment raises important timing questions for
determining the substantive rights protected by the post-Civil War Amendments.
By the fall of 1865, most Republicans had concluded that Congress possessed
broad power under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment to transform African
Americans from slaves to full citizens. 50 These powers included the power to
abolish slavery, the power to prohibit race discrimination, and the power to
provide persons of color and other destitute persons with basic necessities. John
Bingham was the only Republican who disputed this interpretation. His dispute
was limited to the Civil Rights Act of 1866.51 Nevertheless, many Republicans

44. See GRABER, supra note 11 (manuscript at 43).
45. Id. (manuscript at 7).
46. Id. (manuscript at 45–46).
47. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2464, 2471, 2498, 2502, 2504, 2506, 2509, 2510–
2511, 2532, 2534, 2539, 2540–41 (1866).
48. GRABER, supra note 11 (manuscript at 35–36, 39–40).
49. Id. (manuscript at 67–68).
50. Id. (manuscript at 22).
51. Mark A. Graber, The Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill’s Constitution, 94 TEX. L. REV.
1361, 1369–70 (2016).
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suggested narrower interpretations of the Thirteenth Amendment during the
drafting process in Congress. 52 Many Republicans also narrowed their
interpretation of the post-Civil War Amendments after the election of 1867, in
which Democrats gained considerable ground in the north by claiming that
Republicans were too friendly to persons of color. 53 This history further
confounds efforts to determine the original meaning of the post-Civil War
Amendments. Republicans had a narrower understanding of the rights protected
by the post-Civil War Constitution when they drafted the Thirteenth
Amendment then when they ratified the Thirteenth Amendment. Republicans
had a broader understanding of the rights protected by the post-Civil War
Constitution when they drafted the Fourteenth Amendment then when they
ratified the Fourteenth Amendment.
The questions Republicans asked when considering the forgotten Fourteenth
Amendment and the different answers they gave at different times highlights
how the search for the original understanding of the post-Civil War
Amendments makes no sense as an historical matter. Their focus on ensuring
that the Republican Party implemented the Thirteenth Amendment left too few
materials on the scope of the rights protected by Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment for future generations to reach any clear conclusions on the
meaning of such phrases as “privileges and immunities,” “equal protection,” and
“due process.” The search for original meaning is also confounded by
disagreements among Republicans over the rights protected and, outside of
vague commitments to equality under law, the mid-level principles underlying
the Fourteenth Amendment. The dynamics of Reconstruction constitutional
politics further destabilized the original meaning of the post-Civil War
Constitution. Republican commitments to broader or narrower readings of the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments changed dramatically during the
process of drafting and ratification. Teaching the forgotten Fourteenth
Amendment, thus, highlights how framers draft and ratify constitutions during
times of dynamic political change in which crucial concepts do not have stable
meanings and the constitutional enterprise is as often a means for creating
desirable structures for fighting things out in the future as for imposing stable
legal rules on the present. 54
The perspective the forgotten Fourteenth Amendment provides on
originalism hardly obviates the need to teach originalism in a class oriented to
constitutional litigation. Almost all Justices like originalist arguments. Some

52. See MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR, THE ABOLITION OF
SLAVERY, AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 131–33 (2001).
53. Michael Les Benedict, The Rout of Radicalism: Republicans and the Elections of 1867, 18
CIV. WAR HIST. 334, 334–36, 341, 343 (1972).
54. For a similar point, see JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN
THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 12–17 (Vintage Books 1997) (1996).
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claim they are motivated entirely by originalist or textualist arguments. 55
Constitutional law classes need to teach students how to make originalist
arguments, while recognizing what they are doing is not history. Legal
originalism may be little more than finding one’s friends in history and quoting
them out of context. 56 Nevertheless, if such history is what Justices expect from
advocates and influences the path of constitutional law, then students must learn
the proper techniques. Students who through the forgotten Fourteenth
Amendment learn that Fourteenth Amendment originalism is not history may,
freed from the shackles of authentic historical analysis, produce better
“originalist” arguments.
IV. HISTORICIZING MARBURY AND JUDICIAL POWER
The forgotten Fourteenth Amendment sheds light on the place of
constitutional litigation in the United States. Conventional legal analysis treats
constitutional litigation as the primary engine of American constitutional
development. The constitutional politics of the Fourteenth Amendment suggests
that political parties are the primary engine of constitutional development.
Thaddeus Stevens’s fight for Sections 2 and 3 was rooted in his understanding
that the structure of partisan competition drives the official law of the land. If a
professor shifts students’ focus from constitutional litigation to the structure of
partisan competition as the driver of constitutional change they will understand
why Marbury v. Madison 57 had no impact on the constitutional politics of the
nineteenth century, was central to the constitutional politics of the twentieth
century, and has a status not yet determined in the constitutional politics of the
twenty-first century.
Chief Justice Earl Warren’s claim in Cooper v. Aaron that Marbury v.
Madison established “the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in
the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since
been respected by this Court and Country as a permanent and indispensable
feature of our constitutional system” 58 is the single most important passage in a
judicial opinion that law students read during the late twentieth century. Cooper,
law students learned, correctly asserted that Marbury established the Supreme
Court as having the final say on constitutional matters, that the United States had
been committed to judicial supremacy since early adolescence, and that such a
commitment was the mark of a mature constitutional democracy. Constitutional

55. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW (1997).
56. See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 501 N.W.2d 49, 51 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1993);
Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
523, 524–25 (1995).
57. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
58. 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
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law classes taught that departmentalism, the view that each department has the
right to interpret the Constitution for itself, is the only alternative to judicial
supremacy and that the departmentalist alternative only flares up sporadically. 59
The forgotten Fourteenth Amendment offers an alternative history with an
alternative moral. Sections 2, 3, and 4 were drafted by persons who thought
constitutional questions are best settled by the dominant political party of an era.
Thaddeus Stevens and his political allies championed partisan supremacy, which
reigned throughout much of the nineteenth century, as the most important
alternative to judicial supremacy. Martin Van Buren expressed the dominant
view of constitutional authority in Jacksonian America when he declared:
If different interpretations are put upon the Constitution by the different
departments, the people is the tribunal to settle the dispute. Each of the
departments is the agent of the people, doing their business according to the
powers conferred; and where there is a disagreement as to the extent of these
powers, the people themselves, through the ballot-boxes, must settle it. 60

Lincoln and his fellow Republicans were Van Burenites on partisan supremacy.
Lincoln’s most famous assertion on constitutional authority claimed:
We oppose the Dred Scott decision in a certain way, upon which I ought perhaps
to address you a few words. We do not propose that when Dred Scott has been
decided to be a slave by the court, we, as a mob will decide him to be free. We
do not propose that, when any other one, or one thousand, shall be decided by
that court to be slaves, we will in any violent way disturb the rights of property
thus settled; but we nevertheless do oppose that decision as a political rule which
shall be binding on the voter, to vote for nobody who thinks it wrong, which
shall be binding on the members of Congress or the President to favor no
measure that does not actually concur with the principles of that decision. We
do not propose to be bound by it as a political rule in that way, because we think
it lays the foundation not merely of enlarging and spreading out what we
consider an evil, but it lays the foundation for spreading that evil into the States
themselves. We propose so resisting it as to have it reversed if we can, and a
new judicial rule established upon this subject. 61

“We” referred to the Republican Party. “The Dred Scott decision,” Lincoln
asserted in a separate speech, “never would have been made in its present form
if the party that made it had not been sustained previously by the elections.” 62

59. This was the gospel according to Gerald Gunther, whose constitutional law casebook was
the most widely assigned during the 1970s and 1980s. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1–29 (12th ed. 1991).
60. MARTIN VAN BUREN, INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGIN AND COURSE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN
THE UNITED STATES 330 (photo. reprint 1967) (1867).
61. Mr. Lincoln’s Speech, Sixth Debate with Stephen A. Douglas, at Quincy, Illinois (Oct. 13,
1858), in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 245, 255 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
62. Mr. Lincoln’s Speech, Fifth Debate with Stephen A. Douglas, at Galesburg, Illinois (Oct.
7, 1858), in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 61, at 232.
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His discussion of partisan supremacy continued: “My own opinion is, that the
new Dred Scott decision, deciding against the right of the people of the States to
exclude slavery, will never be made, if that party is not sustained by the
elections.” 63 Unlike Jefferson who spoke of independent presidential authority
to interpret the Constitution, 64 Lincoln never claimed constitutional authority to
challenge the Supreme Court on the basis of office. His first inaugural insisted
that Republicans were authorized to reverse the result in Dred Scott because the
people by election had vested that party with the power to determine the
constitutional status of slavery in the territories. Lincoln said:
[T]he candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the government, upon vital
questions, affecting the whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of
the Supreme Court, the instant they are made, in ordinary litigation between
parties, in personal actions, the people will have ceased, to be their own rulers,
having, to that extent, practically resigned their government, into the hands of
that eminent tribunal. 65

The Fourteenth Amendment was rooted in this commitment to partisan
supremacy. Republicans were not interested in creating new rights. Rather,
party members sought to guarantee that the Republican Party would determine
the proper interpretation of the Amendment for the foreseeable future. 66 Doing
so required that party members ensure that southern states did not enjoy a
representative boon from being allocated extra representation in Congress
because the Thirteenth Amendment, by repealing the Three-Fifths Clause in
Article I, Section 2, apparently compelled Congress when allocated seats in the
House of Representations to count as full persons former slaves likely to be
denied the right to vote in the South. That was the point of various versions of
Section 2. 67 Republicans also moved to limit sharply the power of former
Confederate elites by proposing that they be banned from voting or holding
office. That was the point of various versions of Section 3. 68 Nobody bothered
spelling out the rights protected by Section 1 because the persons responsible
for the Fourteenth Amendment believed they were empowering Congress rather
than the federal courts. Republicans in 3,000 pages of the Congressional Globe
rarely if ever indicated whether the Supreme Court could independently enforce
Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendment rights in absence of a federal statute. 69

63. Id.
64. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (May 13, 1793), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 88 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1905).
65. First Inaugural Address−Final Text (Mar. 4, 1861), in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 268 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
66. GRABER, supra note 11 (manuscript at 48–49).
67. Id. (manuscript at 43).
68. Id. (manuscript at 44).
69. Id. (manuscript at 50).
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Judicial supremacy became the official law of the land only with the rise of
non-ideological or divided ideological parties during the late nineteenth
century. 70 As both the Democratic and Republican parties acquired liberal and
conservative wings, both coalitions became poor engines for constitutional
maintenance or change. 71 Early twentieth-century political parties could not be
engines for constitutional maintenance or change on such matters as the
Commerce Clause, the freedom of contract, racial equality, and the freedom of
speech because both parties housed strong proponents of judicial activism and
strong proponents of judicial restraint on each of these issues. Moreover, crucial
party elites did not want to have their coalition take responsibility for being the
engine of constitutional change or maintenance on the leading constitutional
controversies that arose in the early twentieth century. A contemporary cottage
industry has developed demonstrating how divided parties empowered courts to
resolve such hotly contested issues as race and abortion. 72 The Roosevelt
Administration, unwilling to antagonize southerners in Congress by pushing for
legislation mandating racial equality, appointed racial liberals to the Court. The
Republican Eisenhower Administration continued the same policy. 73 The result
was Brown v. Board of Education 74 and a judicial decision four years later in
Cooper v. Aaron that confused the political commitment to judicial supremacy
in the twentieth century as a “permanent” feature of American
constitutionalism. 75
The United States may be returning to the constitutional universe of the
forgotten Fourteenth Amendment. The first foundation of nineteenth-century
partisan supremacy, polarized parties, is firmly in place. Twenty-first century
Democrats and Republicans are, if anything, far more ideologically homogenous

70. Mark A. Graber, Belling the Partisan Cats: Preliminary Thoughts on Identifying and
Mending a Dysfunctional Constitutional Order, 94 B.U. L. REV. 611, 639 (2014); see also Graber,
supra note 26, at 164, 166.
71. Graber, supra note 70, at 641–44.
72. For reviews of this literature, see Mark A. Graber, The Countermajoritarian Difficulty:
From Courts to Congress to Constitutional Order, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 361, 369, 381
(2008); Mark A. Graber, Constructing Judicial Review, 8 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 425, 431, 436, 443
(2005); Mark A. Graber, The Non-Majoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary,
7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35, 36, 45, 53–54 (1993).
73. KEVIN J. MCMAHON, RECONSIDERING ROOSEVELT ON RACE: HOW THE PRESIDENCY
PAVED THE ROAD TO BROWN 97–143, 197–99 (2003).
74. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
75. For discussions of the political foundations of Warren Court judicial liberalism, see LUCAS
A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 485–501 (2002); Howard Gillman,
Party Politics and Constitutional Change: The Political Origins of Liberal Judicial Activism, in
THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 138, 138–160 (Ronald Kahn &
Ken I. Kersch eds., 2006).
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than nineteenth-century Jacksonians, Whigs, and Republicans. 76 The second
foundation of nineteenth-century partisan supremacy, a majority party, is being
erected. Republicans are very close to becoming the dominant national party in
the United States, if they have not achieved that status already. These conditions
may generate renewed commitments to partisan supremacy or a novel allocation
of constitutional authority in the United States. Students familiar with the
forgotten Fourteenth Amendment will at least be aware that, as the dominant
understanding of constitutional authority transformed after the structure of
partisan competition transformed in the past, changes in the structure of partisan
competition in the present may again transform the dominant understanding of
constitutional authority.
IV. TOWARD THE CONSTITUTION OF MEMORY
Professor Sanford Levinson, in a pathbreaking work on America’s
constitutions, coined the phrases “Constitution of Settlement” and “Constitution
of Conversation” for thinking about how the Constitution of the United States is
taught and functions. 77 The Constitution of Conversation is the litigated
constitution. That Constitution consists of those provisions, such as the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, whose interpretation is
debated in our society. Constitutional pedagogy focuses on the Constitution of
Conversation, teaching students the various techniques for making disputed
constitutional questions come out right. The Constitution of Settlement is the
unlitigated constitution. That Constitution consists of those provisions, such as
Article I, Section 3, which requires state equality in the Senate, whose meaning
is clear and uncontroversial. Constitutional law classes rarely teach the
unlitigated provisions of the Constitution, even though such plainly stated rules
of constitutional structure as state equality in the Senate arguably have more
impact on American politics than the litigated provisions of the Constitution. 78
The provisions that constitute the Constitution of Settlement are studied, if
studied at all, by students of American politics who do not think of themselves

76. A legion of works could be cited for this proposition. For two examples, see SARAH A.
BINDER, STALEMATE: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF LEGISLATIVE GRIDLOCK 24–25 (2003)
(describing the impact of party and preference polarization on political stalemate and explaining
the ideological polarization in Congress along these lines); THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J.
ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: HOW CONGRESS IS FAILING AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT
BACK ON TRACK, at x (2006) (“The growing ideological polarization of the parties, the
transformation of intense partisanship into virtually tribal politics . . . contributed to a climate on
Capitol Hill that we found unsettling and destructive.”).
77. SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S 51 CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF
GOVERNANCE 19 (2012).
78. See FRANCES E. LEE & BRUCE I. OPPENHEIMER, SIZING UP THE SENATE: THE UNEQUAL
CONSEQUENCES OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION (1999).
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as engaged in constitutional law or even as having anything interesting to say to
constitutional lawyers.
Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment belong to a different
Constitution, the Constitution of Memory. This Constitution consists of those
provisions that once played or were intended to play vital roles in American
constitutionalism, but do not play any role in present constitutional politics.
Some provisions in the Constitution of Memory are anachronisms. The
congressional power to issue letters of marque and reprisal permitting private
shipowners to attack the enemy or the Third Amendment are two examples.
Other provisions have been interpreted away over time. The Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment falls into this category. 79 Still
other provisions in the Constitution of Memory have been repealed. Copies of
the Constitution of the United States include the Fugitive Slave Clause, even
though the Thirteenth Amendment nullified that provision. Finally, the
Constitution of Memory includes the forgotten Fourteenth Amendment,
provisions designed to play crucial roles in structuring a constitutional regime
that no longer exists. The present American commitment to judicial supremacy
and the institutional practices that make judicial supremacy seem natural make
unnecessary, if not unintelligible, constitutional provisions rooted in partisan
supremacy and the long gone institutional practices that made that understanding
of constitutional authority seem natural in Martin Van Buren and Abraham
Lincoln.
The Constitution of Memory might be folded into the Constitution of
Settlement. No serious conversations exist about the meaning of provisions in
either Constitution. Still, unlike the Constitution of Settlement, provisions in the
Constitution of Memory may not be clear and they do not have substantial
impact on contemporary politics. They seem relics from a constitutional past.
This Essay is a brief argument for including the Constitution of Memory in
the pedagogy of constitutional law. Most constitutional law courses pay some
attention to the constitutional past, even when that past is not part of the
constitutional present. If we teach such cases as Schenck v. United States in part
to highlight the cribbed interpretation past generations gave to First Amendment
freedoms, 80 then we should teach the forgotten Fourteenth Amendment to
highlight how past generations understood constitutional authority. Students
should recognize that the Constitution of Memory may become the Constitution

79. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 96 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting) (“[If the Clause]
refers . . . to such privileges and immunities as were before its adoption specially designated in the
Constitution or necessarily implied as belonging to citizens of the United States, it was a vain and
idle enactment which accomplished nothing, and most unnecessarily excited Congress and the
people on its passage.”).
80. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
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of the Living Dead. 81 One enduring feature of American constitutionalism is that
provisions and decisions long thought buried sometimes come back to life in
ways that fundamentally alter the official constitutional law of the land. Bush v.
Gore resurrected McPherson v. Blacker. 82 Future litigators may revive Section
2. The Constitution of Memory enables students to distinguish between
historical originalism and legal originalism by pointing to the different purposes
constitutional language served in the past and in the present. The persons
responsible for the Fourteenth Amendment, operating in a constitutional
universe structured by partisan supremacy, were doing something different
when adding constitutional text than contemporary Americans, raised on judicial
supremacy, do when they consider constitutional amendments.
The Constitution of Memory belies the tendency to think of contemporary
constitutional practice as the inevitable outcome of 1787, of 1868, or as essential
to democratic constitutionalism. The persons responsible for the Fourteenth
Amendment had a distinctive notion of how constitutions work. Sections 2, 3,
and 4 are the core of their working constitution. By returning to the forgotten
Fourteenth Amendment, we may better understand how our Constitution worked
in the past, how our Constitution works in the present, whether our Constitution
works in the present, how our Constitution might work in the future and how our
Constitution might work better in the future.

81. Keith E. Whittington & John Maclean, It’s Alive! The Persistence of the Constitution, 11
GOOD SOC’Y 8, 8 (2002).
82. 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000).

